This paper studies the positive implications of overcon…dence in insurance markets, both under perfect competition and under monopoly. We …nd that overcon…dence explains a number of stylized facts: (i) why a large fraction of individuals chooses to be uninsured or underinsured even in perfectly competitive markets, (ii) the strong relationship between underinsurance and young age, (ii) price heterogeneity within and across risk classes, (iii) the possibly negative or indeterminate relationship between ex-post risk and insurance coverage. Further, we …nd that overcon…dence may have an opposite e¤ect than a reduction of risk aversion. Unlike many previous behavioural models, a monopolist cannot exploit biased agents: Its pro…ts decrease in the fraction of overcon…dent agents.
Introduction
An extensive empirical literature …nds that many agents underestimate their health, …nancial and driving risks, and this often results in underinvestment in precautionary activities, such as insurance. 1 This paper delivers novel positive implications of overcon…dence in insurance markets, both under perfect competition and under monopoly. We …nd that our results explain a number of stylized facts. To keep matters as transparent as possible, we build our analysis of overcon…dence in perfectly competitive insurance markets on the basic adverse-selection model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . Like Rothschild and Stiglitz, we assume that insurance companies cannot directly observe their customers'risk. Unlike them, we allow for overcon…dent agents. Some agents believe that their risk is low, when, in fact, it is high. The other agents know their risk. We then extend our analysis to show the robustness of our results when there is a monopolistic insurance …rm, building on the model of Rothschild (1976) .
Consider the case of perfect competition …rst. We …nd that low-risk and overcon…dent agents are pooled in the same insurance contracts, and separated from the full-insurance contract of high-risk agents. When the fraction of overcon…dent agents is small, an increment in the fraction of overcon…dent agents increases the insurance coverage of low-risk and overcon…dent agents.
Instead, when overcon…dence is pervasive, an increment in the fraction of overcon…dent agents decreases the insurance coverage of low-risk and overcon…dent agents. The contract of highrisk agents is not a¤ected by the fraction of overcon…dence agents. As overcon…dence becomes more pervasive, the price of the low-risk and overcon…dent agents'contract increases, and hence the welfare of low-risk agents decreases. The welfare of overcon…dent agents decreases only if overcon…dence is su¢ ciently pervasive. The welfare of high-risk agents is unchanged.
Our analysis explains a number of stylized facts. We provide a simple explanation for why a large fraction of individuals chooses to be uninsured or underinsured even in perfectly competi- 1 According to De Bondt and Thaler (1995, p. 389), "perhaps the most robust …nding in the psychology of judgment is that people are overcon…dent." An earlier account of the pervasiveness of overcon…dence in insurance markets is given by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations (1776): "That the chance of loss is frequently undervalued, and scarce ever valued more than it is worth, we may learn from [the limited demand for insurance]. Taking the whole kingdom at an average, nineteen houses in twenty, or rather, perhaps, ninety-nine in a hundred, are not insured from …re. tive markets. Indeed, a large number of U.S. residents is underinsured or has no motor insurance.
According to the Insurance Research Council (IRC), an average of 14.9% of motorists were uninsured between 1989 and 1997. Similarly, an estimated 15.2% of the U.S. population did not have health insurance in 2002, according to US Census data. According to our analysis, low-risk and overcon…dent agents may not buy insurance, because they believe that its price is not worth the risk to which they are subject.
One speci…c feature of the uninsured problem that our analysis allows to explain is the relationship between young age and underinsurance. Established experimental evidence …nds that overcon…dence is persistent in any age group, but is particularly pervasive among young adults.
At the same time, young adults (18 to 24 years old) are less likely than any other population segment to buy health or automobile insurance. Under some regularity conditions, we …nd that if overcon…dence becomes less pervasive with age and the fraction of low-risk agents decreases in age, then the average insurance coverage increases with age. This result helps explain why the fraction of individuals without health insurance is so high among young adults: When health is concerned, it is likely that both fractions of overcon…dent and of low-risk individuals decrease in age. The implications for motorist insurance are less clear: While the insurance coverage of low-risk and overcon…dent agents increases in age, it could be that the average coverage decreases in age if the fraction of high-risk unbiased motorists decreased in age su¢ ciently fast. Third, our model accounts for the following two stylized facts, which are seldom explained simultaneously in previous models of insurance with perfect competition. For any given coverage amount, the prices of insurance contracts are higher for agents who belong to riskier classes. 2 Yet the data also show large heterogeneity in prices within risk classes (e.g. Chiappori and Salanié, 2001 ). In our model, agents with di¤erent perceived risk choose di¤erent contracts, within each risk class. Unlike most models of insurance with symmetric information, prices di¤er within risk classes. But unlike the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model, the agents' actual risk cannot be fully screened, because overcon…dent and low risk agents choose the same contract. The price of this contract is higher for agents in riskier classes, because the fraction of overcon…dent agents is higher. 2 A risk class is a set of agents with observationally equivalent risk.
Fourth, we study the implications of overcon…dence for the relationship between risk and insurance coverage. A general and robust implication of asymmetric information (without overcon…dence) is a positive relationship between ex-post risk and insurance coverage, within each risk class (Chiappori et al., 2002) . Recent empirical analyses reject this implication. A statistically non-signi…cant relation is detected by Chiappori and Salanié (2001) in French automobile insurance datasets, by Cawley and Philipson (1999) in U.S. life insurance datasets, and by Cardon and Hendel (2001) in the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey.
We expand our basic and suppose that overcon…dent agents are riskier than high-risk unbiased ones. Then, when su¢ ciently many agents are overcon…dent, agents who perceive their risk is low are riskier on average. In this case, the relation between insurance coverage and ex-post risk become negative, and the insurance contracts display quantity discounts (as it has been observed for example, by Cawley and Philipson (1999) ). These results may account also for the lack of statistically signi…cant relation found in the previously mentioned data sets, because there may be cancellations when comparing di¤erent insurance choices that correspond to di¤erent perceived risks: By canceling positive with negative relations, the overall relationship may easily turn out to be statistically not signi…cant. This does not mean that overcon…dence is observationally equivalent to symmetric information, because the relationship between insurance coverage and self-reported perceived risk remains positive. Furthermore, symmetric information and perfect competition imply that all agents are fully insured. In our model, overcon…dent and low-risk individuals may be severely underinsured even under perfect competition.
Further, in our model, overcon…dence leads to opposite implications from a reduction of risk aversion. In previous models of overcon…dence, both overcon…dence and reduction in risk aversion lead decision makers to greater willingness to take risks. In the context of insurance, this suggests that both overcon…dent and less risk averse individuals reduce insurance coverage. But this result is overturned when considering asymmetric information. We show that adding a small fraction of less risk averse individuals to the basic Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model reduces average equilibrium insurance coverage. In contrast, adding a small fraction of overcon…dent individuals increases equilibrium coverage.
We then turn to studying monopolistic insurance markets with overcon…dence, to establish the robustness of our previous results. Unlike the case of perfect-competition markets, we …nd that the e¤ect of an increase in the fraction of overcon…dent agents is qualitatively indistinguishable from the e¤ect of an increase in high-risk agents. Indepenently from the pervasiveness of overcon…dence in the economy, an increment in the fraction of overcon…dent agents induces a reduction of the insurance coverage of low-risk and overcon…dent agents. As in the perfect competition case, overcon…dence accounts for (i) the uninsurance and underinsurance phenomenon, (ii) a partial explanation of the relationship between young age and underinsurance, (iii) price heterogeneity within and across risk classes, (iv) the possibly negative or indeterminate relationship between ex-post risk and insurance coverage.
To conclude, we observe that monopolistic insurance markets display interesting welfare properties in the presence of overcon…dence. Overcon…dence lowers the welfare of high-risk agents, but not of low risk agents, despite the fact that the latter are pooled with overcon…dent agents in the monopolistic solution, and the separated from high-risk unbiased agents. Interestingly, overcon…dence lowers the pro…t of the monopolist. Unlike other models of behavioral economics, the monopolist cannot exploit biased agents. This implies that the monopolist has an incentive to advertise so as to reduce the overcon…dence bias in the population.
The paper is presented as follows. After the literature review, section 3 presents the model with perfect competition. A graphical description of equilibrium is presented in section 4. Section 5 presents our main positive results with perfect competition. The following section studies monopolistic insurance with overcon…dence. Section 7 concludes. The appendix lays out the formal analysis.
Related Literature
Experimental Evidence of Overcon…dence Survey studies, with the most disparate subject samples, show that a large fraction of individuals believe that they are healthier, more …nancially secure and better drivers than the median individual. 3 Widely replicated experimental 3 Such results by Svenson (1981) on overcon…dence of driving ability in Sweden have been replicated in Australia, the United States, Canada, Britain, Finland, France, as well as in Germany, Spain and Brazil. The results by Weinstein (1980) that subjects overestimates of their future …nancial success have been replicated in the US, Sweden, New Zealand, Belgium, Morocco, Poland, the UK, Hawaii, Switzerland, and in the Netherlands. Health studies …nd evidence of overoptimism by comparing self-reported risk with objective personal risk. Kreuter and Strecher (1995) and Robb et al. (2004) found evidence of health risk underestimation in relation to medical exams. Overcon…dence has been detected by Groeger and Grande (1996) who compare drivers' self-assessments skills with those assessed by an instructor. Walton and McKeown (2001) compare self-reported and actual speed of drivers. Hoch (1985) found that MBA students overestimate the number of job o¤ers they will receive and the magnitude of their salary. 4 While overcon…dence is not a universal phenomenon, it seems established in the behavioral literature that most subjects tend to underestimate risks in complex uncertain situations that they believe are partially under their control.
The implications of overcon…dence and of the illusion of control on precautionary behavior have been con…rmed in several studies. Overcon…dence has been recognized as a major determinant of tra¢ c safety in many institutional studies (e.g. the European Union projects by Hatakka et al., 2002 , and by Bartl, 2000) . Health risk underestimation is recognized as a major barrier preventing healthy behavior (see the survey by Hoorens, 1994) . There is also evidence that overcon…dence induces poor …nancial planning and economic decisions. Benartzi (2001) …nds that employees severely underestimate the risks of their own company stock, which is over-represented in their retirement saving plans. The experimental results by Camerer and Lovallo (1999) suggest that entrepreneurs'overcon…dence of their ability is one of the main factors to explain the wellestablished phenomenon of excess entry in competitive markets. Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) review experimental work that suggests that parties to legal disputes are reluctant to settle out of court because they hold overly optimistic beliefs about the merits of their case.
To our knowledge, empirical testing of overcon…dence in insurance markets is still underdeveloped. However, there are some studies on the subject. Spurred by proposed welfare reforms in the UK, Cebulla (1999) conducted surveys on the perception of the risk of becoming unemployed and the willingness to purchase unemployment insurance. He detected underestimation of risk by comparing self-reported assessments with statistical assessments. Risk underestimation reduced the willingness to buy insurance. Bhattacharya, Goldmanz and Sood (2004) study secondary lifeovercon…dence has been detected in samples from the US, the UK, the Netherlands, Israel, Tanzania, and Norwegia. 4 There is also strong speci…c evidence that overcon…dence does not vanish with learning nor with experience. For example, Dalziel and Job (1997) found that professional drivers, such as metropolitan taxi drivers from Sydney, underestimate their risk of automobile accident.
insurance markets, where consumers with a life-threatening illness may sell their life insurance policies in return for an up-front payment. They …nd evidence that patients who underestimate their risk of death are unwilling to hold insurance coverage. 5 We conclude this brief review with an important quali…cation. While there is strong evidence that subjects underestimate risk on uncertain activities that they believe are under their control, such as driving or …nancial planning, or that pertain to their self-image, such as health, there is no empirical evidence (to our knowledge) that subjects underestimate the risk of other uncertain events such as …res, ‡oods, earthquakes, theft, malfunctioning of durable goods etc. Hence our analysis does not apply to such insurance markets. Among the experimental papers studying some of these markets, some suggest that subjects overinsure (e.g. Eisner at Strotz, 1961, on airplane travel insurance) and some that they underinsure (e.g. Kunreuther et al., 1978 , on disaster insurance).
The aim of this paper is not to build a complete behavioral theory of insurance. We focus on implications of a well-documented and speci…c bias: underestimation of personal risk. We assume that subjective probabilities di¤er from objective ones, but our analysis is entirely within the standard expected utility representation. Among further departures from standard insurance models, one may consider prospect theory (Kahneman and Tverski 1979) , and regret theory (Bell 1982 ). Our analysis can be extended by employing some of these non-standard theory utility representation, instead of the expected utility representation. Preliminary investigations suggest that our main results remain qualitatively unchanged (details available upon request).
Related Work in Behavioral Economics Our paper is most closely related to two separate branches in behavioral economics. The …rst branch is a growing literature which studies market interaction between sophisticated …rms and behaviorally biased consumers.
Among these papers, Ellison (2005) and Gabaix and Laibson (2005) study models where naive consumers overlook add-on prices, or underestimate the chances that they will be subject to 5 Beyond such empirical analyses, there seems to be consensus that underestimation of health risks is one of the factors explaining the large number of individuals without insurance in the U.S. (an estimated 15.2 percent of the population in 2002, or 43.6 million people). Also, the very limited purchase of long-term care insurance the U.S. (roughly 10% of those aged 65 purchased such insurance in 2000), may be partly be blamed on the public underestimation of the risk involved in being uninsured. hidden fees. In equilibrium, …rms only advertise low base prices. Sophisticate consumers exploit the low base prices without purchasing the add-on, and carefully avoid hidden fees. Unshrouding add-ons is not pro…table to …rms and the practice of hidden prices survives even in competitive markets. A similar exploitation of naive consumers by sophisticated consumers in competitive markets is shown by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) , who study a model where consumers may have naive or sophisticated beliefs on their present-biased future tastes.
Unlike these models, our biased overcon…dent agents cannot be separated from low-risk agents, because their beliefs are the same. Overcon…dent agents exert negative externalities, as they increase their insurance prices. This entails an e¢ ciency loss, not only distributive e¤ects. Spiegler (2005) …nds an e¢ ciency loss in a market where consumers have bounded ability to make inference on quality by sampling goods. Increased competition causes …rms to increase their e¤ort to complicate the consumer's inference, and market e¢ ciency may deteriorate. Unlike our work, his emphasis is on equilibrium characterization, rather than mechanism design and policy analysis.
More distantly related to our paper, Heidhues and Koszegi (2004) provide a rationale for price stickiness and countercyclical markups in where a model pro…t-maximizing monopolist sells to loss-averse consumers with rational expectations.
The second closely related branch of behavioral economics studies the economic e¤ects of overcon…dence. For brevity, we discuss only a small subset of this literature. Benabou and Tirole (2002) and Koszegi (2000) show that an overcon…dent time-inconsistent individual may strategically choose to ignore information about her uncertain payo¤, and Benabou and Tirole When contracting is restricted to debt, they …nd that overcon…dent entrepreneurs may borrow more short-term debt than unbiased ones. Compte and Postlewaite (2003) show that it may be optimal to be overcon…dent when performance is enhanced by con…dence, even though this may result in taking excessive risks. Van den Steen (2004) shows that agents with di¤erent priors may become overcon…dent, because they only choose actions they overestimate chances of success, and attribute failure to exogenous factors.
Sobel and Pinto (2005) provide a framework that explains optimistic self-assessments. Individuals have heterogeneous production functions that determine ability as a function of multiple skills.
They make skill-enhancing investments, and make ability comparisons with others using their own production function.
The Model
Our model introduces overcon…dence in the basic framework of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . For each agent, there are two possible states of the world: in state 2 an accident of damage d occurs and the individual's wealth is W d; and in state 1 her wealth is W: An insurance contract is a pair = ( 1 ; 2 ) so that the individual's wealth is (W 1 ; W d + 2 ) when buying . The amount 1 is the premium, 1 + 2 is the payment, or insurance coverage, and P = 1 =( 1 + 2 ) is the price of a unit of insurance. We assume that 1 0; 2 0: individuals cannot take on more risk through an insurance contract. Let p be the likelihood that the accident occurs. So, an agent's expected
We assume that U is twice di¤erentiable, that U 0 > 0 and that U 00 < 0; so that individuals are risk averse. Risk is measured by the probability p of an accident. It can either be high
There are three types of agents in the economy. High risk (type H) and Low risk (type L) are agents who know that their risks are p H and p L ; respectively. Overcon…dent (type O) agents believe that their risk is low when in fact it is high. 6 Let 2 (0; 1) be the fraction of low risk agents in the economy. Let 2 (0; 1) the fraction of overcon…dent agents in the economy, so that + 1:
The insurance market is a competitive industry of expected pro…t maximizing (risk neutral) companies. A contract sold to an agent with risk p yields expected pro…t (p; ) = (1 p) 1
The insurance …rms cannot observe a subscriber's risk or beliefs, but they know and : A perfectly-competitive equilibrium is a set of contracts A such that: (i) no contract 2 A makes strictly negative expected pro…ts, and (ii) no contract 0 = 2 A makes strictly positive pro…ts.
Remark. As in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , a perfectly-competitive equilibrium may fail to exist for some parameter values. Hence, we also consider the weaker concept of locally-competitive equilibrium, which always exists. This concept is formally de…ned and analyzed in the Appendix. Informally, a set of contracts A is locally-competitive if the insurance …rms cannot make positive pro…ts by introducing small changes in the contracts they already o¤er. 7 Any perfectlycompetitive equilibrium is also locally-competitive, but not viceversa. The parameter values of our main interest are those for which a perfectly-competitive equilibrium does exist.
Graphical Description of Equilibrium
Equilibrium in Insurance Markets without Overcon…dence For future reference, we brie ‡y consider the model without overcon…dence, i.e., = 0: Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that the equilibrium is separating. Subscribers are screened according to the contract they choose.
High-risk individuals fully insure. Their contract H equalizes wealth across states and lies on the intersection of the 45-degree line with the zero-pro…t line H = 0: Incentive compatibility requires that high-risk subscribers (weakly) prefer contract H to the low-risk individuals'contract L : 6 To simplify the exposition, we focus on the case that the di¤erence between low risk and high risk is not too small relative to the damage d: That is, we assume that
7 In a general-equilibrium model, Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) establish the general existence of a separating equilibrium that approximates the locally-competitive equilibrium. Riley (1979) shows that the locally-competitive equilibrium coincides with a "reactive" equilibrium concept where each …rm, before introducing new contracts, anticipates that …rms already in the market will react by o¤ering new contracts, as long as they generate positive pro…ts. Wilson (1977) proposes an alternative reactive equilibrium where …rms anticipate that any loss-making contracts will be removed as a reaction to any newly-introduced contracts .
Hence, the contract L lies on the intersection of the zero-pro…t line L = 0 with the indi¤erence curve I H (through the high-risk agents' contract H ). The contracts ( L ; H ) are a (unique) perfectly competitive equilibrium as long as the fraction of low-risk subscribers is su¢ ciently small. The equilibrium contracts are illustrated in Figure 1 .
Equilibrium in Insurance Markets with Overcon…dence
We now describe equilibrium with overcon…dence (i.e., > 0): The core of our analysis is based on two intuitive insights. The …rst one is that insurance …rms cannot screen between overcon…dent and low-risk individuals because, at the time of purchasing insurance, both types believe that their risk is low. Given this quali…cation, arguments analogous to the analysis of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) allow us to conclude that in the unique competitive equilibrium, individuals are separated on the basis of their beliefs. High-risk individuals purchase a contract H ; whereas low-risk and overcon…dent individuals choose a di¤erent contract LO . As in the case without overcon…dence, high-risk individuals fully insure.
The average accident probability of overcon…dent and low-risk agents is
Perfect competition requires that the equilibrium contract LO satis…es the zero-pro…t condi-
= 0 (in short, LO = 0): So, the price of insurance P LO coincides with p LO : As the fraction of overcon…dence agents increases, the zero-pro…t line LO = 0 rotates counterclockwise towards the zero-pro…t line for high-risk types, H = 0:
This leads to the second insight. Unlike in the case without overcon…dence, incentive compatibility need not be binding in equilibrium. As we argue below, it does not bind when the fraction of overcon…dent individuals is large enough relative to the fraction of low risk agents . In order to describe the equilibrium, we distinguish between three di¤erent cases depending on the parameters and : The three signi…cant parameter regions are characterized by the threshold functions 1 ( ) and 2 ( ); formally de…ned in the appendix. in Figure 1 it was ‡atter). Hence, + is no longer an equilibrium because any contract lying to the right of + between the indi¤erence curve I L and the zero-pro…t line LO = 0 would make strictly positive pro…ts. 8 The equilibrium contract for low risk and overcon…dent agents, denoted by LO ; is determined by the tangency point of the indi¤erence curve I L on the zero-pro…t line LO = 0. Under some regularity assumptions, the low risk and overcon…dent individuals'
decreases in : 9 The low risk and overcon…dent individuals' equilibrium utilities decrease in : By revealed preferences, low-risk agents' utilities are higher than high-risk agents'utilities, which in turn are larger than overcon…dent agents'utilities.
Case 3: large overcon…dence When the fraction of overcon…dent individuals is large, > 2 ( ); the incentive compatibility still does not bind. Furthermore, the zero-pro…t line LO = 0 is su¢ ciently close to the zero-pro…t line H = 0 so that it becomes ‡atter than the indi¤erence curve I L that passes through the no-insurance contract 0: Hence, a corner solution LO = 0 is obtained. Low risk and overcon…dent agents believe that the insurance contracts they are o¤ered are so unfavorable that they do not insure. 8 Any such contract makes strictly positive pro…ts because it is purchased only by low risk and overcon…dent agents and its price is larger than P LO ; as lies below the zero-pro…t line LO = 0: Low risk and overcon…dent agents prefer this contract to + ; because lies above the indi¤erence curve IL: High-risk agents still prefer 
Positive Results
This section explores the positive implications of overcon…dence in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model. We deliver novel testable implications that distinguish our analysis from previous models of overcon…dence and from previous insurance models. We explain stylized facts that are harder to reconcile with models of insurance markets that abstract from overcon…dence.
Under-Insurance and Overcon…dence The …rst result follows directly from the previous analysis.
Result 1 For any and ; low-risk and overcon…dent individuals are underinsured in equilibrium.
In the extreme case that > 2 ( ) ; low-risk and overcon…dent individuals choose to be completely uninsured in equilibrium.
This result gives a simple account for the fact that a large fraction of the U.S. population is underinsured or has no motor insurance. Indeed, according to the Insurance Research Council (IRC), an average of 14.9% of motorists were uninsured between 1989 and 1997. An alternative theoretical explanation is that severely budget-constrained motorists do not to insure and declare bankruptcy in case of accident where they are at fault (see Smith and Wright, 1992 The relationship between age and underinsurance One speci…c feature of the underinsurance problem that our analysis allows to explain is the relationship between young age and underinsurance. Established experimental evidence …nds that overcon…dence is persistent in any age group, but is particularly pervasive among young adults. At the same time, young adults (18 to 24 years old) are less likely than any other population segment to buy health or automobile insurance.
In order to formalize our intuition that the fraction of uninsured agents is higher among young adults because they are more likely to overcon…dent, we need to expand our basic model and introduce a veri…able characteristic, age, which we denote by a: The composition of overcon…dent and low-risk individuals di¤er across age groups: For any age group a; we let (a) and (a) be the fractions of overcon…dent and low-risk agents respectively, among the agents with age equal to a:
For the moment, we do not make speci…c assumptions on the relationship between age and actual individual's risk. In the context of health insurance, it is conceivable that risk increases with age, whereas in the context of driving insurance, it is likely decreasing in age, or, possibly U-shaped. Following experimental evidence, we assume that young agents are more likely to underestimate their risk than older agents. Speci…cally, experiments …nd that the distribution of subjects'actual risk of accident stochastically dominates the distribution of beliefs, and that the discrepancy between these two distributions decreases in age. When there are two levels of risk, p L and p H ; this means that the ratio
between the fraction of agents who believe that their risk is low, (a) + (a) ; and the fraction whose risk is actually low, (a) ; decreases in a: Evidently, if (a) is held constant, this is equivalent to say that the fraction of overcon…dent agents (a) decreases in a:
Because age is veri…able by insurance companies, individuals of di¤erent age a are o¤ered di¤erent contracts (a) that depend on a: In a competitive market, each contract (a) must make zero-pro…t. Hence, the equilibrium contracts (a) in each age group a are derived as if the age group a was a single separate insurance market. The equilibrium contracts (a) are determined by the parameters (a) and (a) through to the equilibrium characterization in the previous section. High risk agents in all age group still purchase the same contract H . Low risk and overcon…dent agents choose a contract LO (a) ; function of the parameters (a) and (a) ;
which depend on age a:
We now show that if the ratio (a) decreases in a; then the insurance coverage of low-risk and overcon…dent agent LO 1 (a) + LO 2 (a) increases in age. Hence, when both (a) and either (a) or the sum (a) + (a) weakly decrease in age, the average insurance coverage, C(a)
Result 2 Suppose that in all age groups a; the fraction of overcon…dent individuals is large enough relative to the fraction of low-risk individuals ; i.e., (a) > 1 ( (a)) : If the overcon…-dence ratio (a) and, either the fraction of low-risk agents, or the sum of low-risk and overcon…dent agents (a) + (a) (or both) decrease in age a; then the average insurance coverage C(a)
increases with age a:
The above result provide a possible explanation for the positive relationship between age and insurance coverage in health insurance markets, where both the fraction of low-risk agents (a) and the overcon…dence ratio (a) decrease in age. In the context of motorist insurance, where (a) likely increases in age, our explanation for the positive relationship between age and insurance coverage requires that the fraction of overcon…dent agents (a) decreases with age a su¢ ciently fast. Further, if the fraction of low-risk agents (a) is held constant, the above result implies that the average insurance coverage C(a) increases with age a as long as the fraction of overcon…dent agents (a) decreases in a:
Risk Classi…cation Our model accounts for the following two stylized facts, which are seldom explained simultaneously in previous models of insurance. For any given coverage amount, the prices of insurance contracts are higher for agents who belong to riskier classes. 12 Yet the data also show large heterogeneity in prices within risk classes (e.g. Chiappori and Salanié, 2001 ).
Risk classi…cation is introduced in our model, by assuming that each agent has a public veri…able signal x: her risk class. We assume that the higher the risk class x; the more likely the individual's risk is high and the more likely that she is overcon…dent. 13 Hence, (x) -the fraction of overcon…dent agents in class x-increases in x; whereas (x) -the fraction of low risk agents in class x-decreases in x.
Individuals in di¤erent risk classes x are o¤ered di¤erent contracts (x) : In a competitive market, each contract (x) must make zero-pro…t. Hence, the equilibrium contracts (x) in each risk class a are derived as if the risk class x was a single separate insurance market. The equilibrium contracts (a) are determined by the parameters (x) and (x), through to the equilibrium characterization in the previous section.
In the equilibrium of our model, low risk and overcon…dent agents choose the same contract
] depends on the composition of overcon…dent and low-risk individuals which, in turn, is di¤erent in di¤erent risk classes.
High risk agents in all risk classes still purchase the same contract H . The insurance price P H for high-risk agents is higher than P LO (x) for every x: Formally, we have concluded that:
Result 3
For any x such that (x) < 2 ( (x)) ; the insurance price P LO (x) increases in x; but P H (x) > P LO (x); for every x:
This result implies that our model accounts for the two above-mentioned stylized facts.
First, for any given coverage amount, insurance contract prices are higher on average for agents who belong to riskier classes. This is di¢ cult to explain in insurance models with asymmetric information. In the equilibrium of the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model, insurance …rms do not make their contracts depend on risk classes. Regardless of the signal x; high-risk agents 1 2 A risk class is a set of agents with observationally equivalent risk. 1 3 In the context of automobile insurance, this relates to experimental evidence that young male novice drivers are more likely overcon…dent than older and than female ones. Also, a bad driving record may be understood as evidence of overcon…dent, reckless driving habits. The insurance …rms learn that the driver is likely to be risky, but the driver maintains her overcon…dent belief of being a …rst-class driver.
choose contract H ; and low-risk ones choose L : Hence insurance prices P L (x) and P H (x) are independent of the signal x: In contrast, in our model the price P LO (x) of contracts o¤ered to low-risk and overcon…dent agents increases in x, whereas P H (x) stays constant.
Second, the data show a large heterogeneity in insurance price that is not justi…ed by risk classes. This fact is di¢ cult to explain in models with symmetric information. If the risk class is a su¢ cient statistics of each agent's actual risk, then perfect competition implies that the equilibrium price P (x) of an agent's insurance contract (x) depends only on her risk class x:
Instead, in our model the insurance price P H for high-risk agents is higher than P LO (x) within each risk class x:
The Relation between Insurance Coverage and Ex-Post Risk. The recent empirical studies that we discuss in the literature review have intensively studied the relationship between insurance coverage and risk, as a robust way to test for the presence of asymmetric information in insurance markets. To contribute to this research, we now extend our basic model by supposing that the overcon…dent individuals' risk p O is higher than the high-risk individuals' risk p H ; following the wide-spread supposition that overcon…dent individuals are the riskiest ones. Our previous results qualitatively extend, and we arrive to the following result. 14 
Result 4 Suppose that
> p H ; the pricing schedule displays quantity discounts.
When the fraction of overcon…dent individuals is large relative to low-risk individuals, we explain the empirical …nding that the pricing schedule may display quantity discounts (Cawley and Philipson (1999)). Further, we reverse the standard prediction that unobservable risk is positively 1 4 For parameter constellations where pO is very large relative to pH and is very large, it is theoretically possible that
High-risk individuals buy so much insurance that they are better o¤ in the case of accident. We disregard this case as irrealistic, particularly in a model abstracting from moral hazard. related with insurance coverage. 15 This may account also for the lack of statistically signi…cant relation found in the previously mentioned data sets, because there may be cancellations when comparing di¤erent insurance choices that correspond to di¤erent perceived risks: By canceling positive with negative relations, the overall relationship may easily turn out to be statistically not signi…cant. 16 This does not mean that adverse selection cannot be tested in insurance markets:
our model provides the following testable implication.
Result 5 Adverse selection implies a positive relationship between insurance coverage and selfreported risk assessment, even in the presence of overcon…dence.
This simple result provides a robust test for asymmetric information (among others, Cawley and Philipson (1999) perform this test). When a positive relationship between insurance coverage
and self-reported risk is detected, classical analysis of insurance markets without asymmetric information is inappropriate, even if self-reported risk is uncorrelated with ex-post risk. Absent asymmetric information, perfect competition prescribes that all individuals be fully insured. Our model with adverse selection and overcon…dence, the coverage of overcon…dent and low-risk may be severely constrained.
Risk aversion and Overcon…dence
In previous models of overcon…dence, over-optimistic beliefs cannot be distinguished from a reduction of risk aversion. They both lead decision makers to greater willingness to take risks. In the context of insurance, this suggests that both overcon…-dent and less risk averse individuals reduce insurance coverage. But this result is overturned when considering asymmetric information. We have shown in the previous section that adding a small fraction of overcon…dent individuals to a basic adverse selection model increases equilibrium insurance coverage. When the fraction of overcon…dent agents is small, the incentive-compatibility constraint binds in equilibrium. Adding overcon…dent agents to the economy increases the equilibrium price of low-risk and overcon…dent agents' contracts. As these contracts become less 1 5 Consistently with our predictions, Chiappori and Salanié (2000) …nd a (non statistically signi…cant) negative relation between unobservable risk and coverage for young drivers, who are more likely to be overcon…dent, whereas Cohen (2003) …nds a signi…cant and positive relation for mature drivers. 1 6 The relevance of overcon…dence for the relationship between risk and coverage has also been independently singled out by Koufopoulos (2003) . Unlike our model, his model is based on moral hazard and does not allow for heterogeneous actual risk conditional on perceived risk.
attractive to high-risk subscribers, low-risk and overcon…dent agents'insurance needs to be constrained less to ensure separation. This results in an increment of aggregate insurance coverage.
In contrast, Figure 3 shows that adding a small fraction of high-risk individuals with reduced risk aversion reduces equilibrium insurance coverage. The equilibrium of the unperturbed model is L ; H : high-risk agents are fully insured by contract H and constrain the choice of lowrisk agents L : We perturb the model by introducing less-risk averse, high-risk agents, whose indi¤erence curves are denoted by I H : Because they are less risk averse, the curve I H is ‡atter than I H and hence it imposes a stronger constraint on the choice of low-risk agents. Regardless of the proportion of less risk averse agents, the equilibrium coverage of low-risk agents discontinuously
The comparison between overcon…dence and risk aversion is formalized as follows. We introduce a fraction of high-risk, moderately risk-averse (type-R) agents in the model by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1996) . When purchasing a contract their utility is
; with U 00 < U 00 < 0: An immediate extension of the results by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1996) implies the following result.
Result 6
Adding a small fraction of R-type individuals to the basic adverse-selection model reduces the insurance coverage.
Risk neutral individuals are aware of their risk preference, whereas overcon…dent agents do not know they are overcon…dent. They believe incorrectly that their risk is low. This distinction is not quite signi…cant in a decision theoretic model, but it is important in incomplete information games. Agents may signal di¤erent levels of risk aversion by purchasing di¤erent contracts, but overcon…dent agents cannot be separated in this way from unbiased agents with identical perceived risk.
Monopoly
The Model To keep matters simple, and to highlight the e¤ect of overcon…dence, we build on the famous benchmark by Stiglitz (1976) . The model is analogous the one presented in section We show in the appendix that as the fraction of high-risk individuals increases, the contract H moves towards the origin, and the contract L moves towards the contract 0 along the indi¤erence curve I L through the contract 0. Intuitively, as the fraction of high-risk individuals increases, the pro…t H that can be obtained from the contract H increases relative to the pro…t L from the contract L : Hence, the monopolist prefers to seek more pro…t from high-risk individuals increasing the price of the contract H :
When the fraction of high-risk individuals is su¢ ciently large, the solution of the monopolist's maximization problem reaches the corner solution L = 0: In practice, there are so few low-risk agents in the market that the monopolist chooses to ignore them and do not o¤er them any insurance. This allows the monopolist to extract the full surplus from high-risk individuals, by o¤ering them the full-insurance contract that makes them indi¤erent between with no insurance.
Formally the monopoly solution is the pair of contracts ( L ; H ) that maximizes:
The Monopoly Solution with Overcon…dence
We now describe the monopoly solution with overcon…dence (i.e., > 0): The core of our analysis is based on two intuitive insights. The …rst one is that insurance …rms cannot screen between overcon…dent and low-risk individuals because, at the time of purchasing insurance, both types believe that their risk is low. Under the assumption that whenever indi¤erent between two contracts, each agent purchases as much insurance coverage as possible, the overcon…dent and low-risk individuals must necessarily purchase the same insurance contract.
Given this quali…cation, arguments analogous to the analysis of Stiglitz (1976) allow us to conclude that in the monopoly solution, individuals are separated on the basis of their beliefs.
High-risk individuals purchase a contract H ; whereas low-risk and overcon…dent individuals choose a di¤erent contract LO . Again, the contract LO lies on the indi¤erence curve I L through the no-insurance contract 0, and H lies at the crossing of the 45-degree line and the indi¤erence curve I H through the contract LO : But unlike before, the monopolist's pro…t LO from the
Hence, the solution of the monopolist problem is ( H ; LO ) that maximizes:
Inspection of the two maximization problems leads us to the second fundamental insight. The constraints on the set of contracts among which the monopolist maximizes do not change. This insight implies the fundamental result that the e¤ect of an increment of the fraction of overcon…-dent agents is qualitatively indistinguishable from the the e¤ect of an increment of the fraction of high-risk agents : Consider any pair of contracts H ; LO that satis…es the maximization constraints. As the fraction of overcon…dent agents grows, the average risk of low-risk and overcon…dent agents p LO increases. Hence the pro…t LO of any contract LO decreases relative to the pro…t H of the associated contract H : Hence, as grows, the monopolist seeks more more pro…t from the more pro…table contract H : As we have already observed, this implies that the contract H moves towards the origin, and the contract LO moves towards the contract 0 along the indi¤erence curve I L through the contract 0. Hence an increment in the fraction of overcon…dent agents leads to an increment in the price of both contracts H and LO :
Because an increment in the fraction of overcon…dent agents leads to an increment in the price of the full-insurance contract H ; it is immediate to conclude that as overcon…dence becomes more pervasive, the utility of high-risk unbiased individuals is reduced. Instead, the utility of the lowrisk individuals is constant, because the change of the contract LO occurs along the indi¤erence curve I L through the contract 0. Regardless of the fraction of high-risk and overcon…dent agents, the monopolist fully expropriates all surplus from the low-risk agent. Despite the fact that lowrisk and overcon…dent agents are pooled together, overcon…dent agents do not exert any negative e¤ect on low-risk agents welfare. An increment of fraction of overcon…dent agents however, reduces the utility of overcon…dent agents, whose utility is the same as high-risk agents, because of the binding incentive-compatibility constraint
An interesting result concerns monopoly pro…t. It is often the case in behavioral models that a monopolist successfully exploits biased agents to its own advantage. Here, instead, the monopolist pro…t decreases in the fraction of overcon…dent agents : This result can be concluded with a simple 'revealed preferences'argument. Note in fact that because the pro…t LO decreases in ; the pro…t H + LO for any pair of contracts ( H ; LO ) that satis…es the maximization constraints decreases in : As a result, when decreases, the optimal pair of contracts ( H ; LO ) must yield a higher pro…t than the optimal pair associated to the higher initial :
When the fraction becomes su¢ ciently large, and crosses the threshold ( ) that we derive in the appendix, the solution of the monopolist's maximization problem reaches the corner solution L = 0: Intuitively, the pool of overcon…dent and low-risk agents becomes so unprofitable, that the monopolist chooses to ignore them and do not o¤er them any insurance. This allows the monopolist to extract the full surplus from high-risk individuals, by o¤ering them the full-insurance contract that makes them indi¤erent between with no insurance.
Positive Implications
The …rst result follows directly from the previous analysis, and shows the robustness of our result 1, derived in the context of perfect competition: When overcon…dence is su¢ ciently pervasive in the economy, low-risk and overcon…dent agents purchase no insurance.
Result 7 For any and ; low-risk and overcon…dent individuals are underinsured in the monopoly solution. In the extreme case that > ( ) ; then low-risk and overcon…dent individuals are completely uninsured in the monopoly solution.
The second result shows the robustness of our result 2. Young individuals are more likely overcon…dent, and, at the same time, more likely to be underinsured. Because age is veri…able by the monopolist insurance company, individuals of di¤erent age a are o¤ered di¤erent contracts (a) that depend on a: The monopolist is not constrained in its choice of contracts o¤ered to di¤erent agents with di¤erent age, and perfectly di¤erentiate the contract according to the age of the subscriber. Hence, the monopolist can treat each age group as a single di¤ erent market.
The optimal contracts (a) are determined by the parameters (a) and (a) through to the monopolist solution in the previous part of the section. Hence, previous analysis yields these immediately the following results, where we de…ne the average insurance coverage as C(a)
Result 8 As (a) and (a) decrease, the insurance coverage LO 1 (a) + LO 2 (a) of low-risk and overcon…dent agents increases with a. As (a) decreases, and (a) remains constant, the average insurance C (a) increases in age a:
Hence, overcon…dence partially accounts for the relationship between young age and underinsurance. In the case where the fraction of high-risk unbiased agents (a) does not change too dramatically with age, the average coverage C (a) increases in age, because of the change in overcon…dence. However, in the case of motorist insurance, it is conceivable that (a) decreases in age: as drivers become more experienced, their risk decreases. Then, the e¤ect of age on the average insurance coverage C(a) would be ambiguous because for any age group a; the high-risk
Hence the decrease of (a) in age a may imply a decrease of the average coverage C(a): Further, also the relationship between young age and health underinsurance is ambiguous, because likely, the fraction of high-risk agents (a) increases in a: Hence, the e¤ect of a decrease of (a) may be counteracted by the e¤ect of an increase in (a) ; as far as the insurance coverage LO 1 (a) + LO 2 (a) of low-risk and overcon…dent agents is concerned.
As in the perfect competition case, overcon…dence accounts for price heterogeneity within and across risk classes. We recall that risk classi…cation is introduced in our model, by assuming that each agent has a public veri…able signal x: her risk class. We assume that the higher the risk class x; the more likely the individual's risk is high and the more likely that she is overcon…dent. 17 Hence, both (x) -the fraction of overcon…dent agents in class x-and (x) -the fraction of highrisk unbiased agents in class x-increase in x: The monopolist can treat each risk group as a single di¤erent market, hence the optimal contracts (x) are determined by the parameters (x) and (x) through to the monopolist solution in the previous part of the section. It is thus easy to derive the following result.
Result 9
As (x) and (x) increase, the price of both contracts H (x) and LO (x) increase. For any class x; the price of contract H (x) is larger than the price of contract LO (x).
The thrust of the above result is the observation that, because the price of both contracts H (x) and LO (x) increase, there is price heterogeneity across risk classes x: At the same time, because for any class x; the price of contract H (x) is larger than the price of contract LO (x), there is price heterogeneity within risk classes x: It is important to underline however, that overcon…dence is not needed to explain heterogeneity across and within risk classes in the presence of monopoly.
In fact, we have already pointed out that the e¤ect of an increment in the fraction of overcon…dent agents is qualitatively the same as the e¤ect of an increment in the fraction of high-risk agents.
So, the heterogeneity of prices across and within risk classes can be equivalently explained by di¤erences in actual risk across risk classes.
We conclude by considering the robustness of our result 4. Again, we extend our basic model by supposing that the overcon…dent individuals'risk p O is higher than the high-risk individuals'
risk p H . It is easy to conclude that when the average risk of low-risk and overcon…dent agents is larger than the risk of high-risk agents, the monopolist chooses the corner solution LO = 0.
It disregards the non-pro…table pool of low-risk and overcon…dent agents, to extracts full surplus from the high-risk agents. if and only if
> p H ; the low-risk and overcon…dent agents are uninsured, LO = 0:
Again, when the fraction of overcon…dent individuals is large relative to low-risk individuals, we reverse the standard prediction that actual risk is positively related with insurance coverage.
Again, this does not mean that adverse selection cannot be tested in monopolistic insurance markets: Our model provides the implication that adverse selection implies a positive relationship between insurance coverage and self-reported risk assessment, even in the presence of overcon…-dence.
Conclusion
This paper has studied the positive implications of overcon…dence in insurance markets, both under perfect competition and under monopoly. We have found that overcon…dence explains a number of stylized facts: (i) why a large fraction of individuals chooses to be uninsured or underinsured even in perfectly competitive markets, (ii) the strong relationship between underinsurance and young age, (ii) price heterogeneity within and across risk classes, (iii) the possibly negative or indeterminate relationship between ex-post risk and insurance coverage. Further, we have founnd that overcon…dence may have an opposite e¤ect than a reduction of risk aversion. Unlike many previous behavioural models, a monopolist cannot exploit biased agents in our model: Its pro…ts decrease in the fraction of overcon…dent agents.
A Appendix
Perfect Competition -Equilibrium Analysis. This section formalizes the graphical equilibrium analysis of section 4. Before presenting the analysis, we formally de…ne locally-competitive equilibrium.
A locally-competitive equilibrium is a set of contracts A such that when each contract 2 A is available in the market, (i) no contract 2 A makes strictly negative expected pro…ts, and (ii) there is an " > 0 such that any contract 0 for which jj 0 jj < " for any 2 A; would not make strictly positive pro…ts.
The …rst step in the equilibrium analysis shows that overcon…dent and low-risk agents pool together, and together they separate from high-risk agents. For future reference, we de…ne the marginal rate of substitution associated to contract and risk p; as:
Proposition A.1 In the unique locally-competitive equilibrium, high-risk individuals choose the
Low-risk and overcon…dent individuals choose the contract LO that solves the maximization problem
subject to the non-negativity constraint = 0; and to the incentive compatibility and zero-pro…t conditions:
As long as LO > 0; the insurance price P LO equals p LO and increases in :
Proof.
Step 1. In equilibrium, types L and O pool on the same contract LO , type H chooses a di¤ erent contract H .
For any contract ; bought by types H; L and O with probabilities H ; L ; and O ; respectively, let the average risk be: 
Since U is twice di¤erentiable, there is an " > 0 small enough such that for any m 2 (M ( ; p H ) ; M ( ; p L )) ; the contract " (1; m) is purchased by all type L and O agents but not by type H agents. Hence, " (1; m) yields expected pro…t
, which is strictly bigger than ( ) = 0 for " small enough because p > p LO : Because " (1; m) is a local pro…table deviation, cannot be an equilibrium contract.
Because p p LO for any equilibrium contract such that L + O > 0; it follows that
Because ( ) = 0 for all equilibrium contracts, and U 00 < 0; there are therefore at most two equilibrium contracts ; ; with
there is an " > 0 small enough such that for any Step 2. There exists a unique locally-competitive equilibrium, characterized in the statement of Proposition A.1.
By
Step 1, if a locally-competitive equilibrium exists, it is a pair of distinct contracts H ; LO such that LO 
Finally, we note that, because p H > p L ; dp LO =d < 0 and dp LO 
where the variables and are embedded in the expression
Proposition A.2 The incentive compatibility condition (A.2) binds if and only if < 1 ( ) : Proof. Let = ( 1 ; 2 ) be the contract pinned down by condition (A.3) and by the binding incentive compatibility condition (A.2). Di¤erentiating these equations, we obtain:
where the quantity
is positive because U 00 < 0; 1 > d + 2 and p H > p LO : Because dp LO =d < 0 and dp LO =d > 0; we obtain that d 1 =d > 0; d 1 =d < 0; d 2 =d > 0; and d 2 =d < 0:
we obtain: dM ( ; p L ) =d > 0: Because d =dp LO < 0 and dp LO =d > 0; we have shown that for any ; there is a unique threshold 1 pinned down by system (A.4) and that M ( ; p L ) > (< )(1 p LO )=p LO if and only if > (<) 1 ( ) : Because d =d < 0; d =dp LO < 0 and dp LO =d < 0, 1 is strictly increasing in by the implicit function theorem. Since dp LO =d > 0; for any there is a unique threshold 2 ( ) such that M (0; p L ) > (< )(1 p LO )=p LO if and only if > (<) 2 ( ) : When > 2 ( ) ; the constraint 0 binds in equilibrium, whereas when 1 ( ) < < 2 ( ) ; the equilibrium contract LO is pinned down by condition (A.3) and by the tangency condition (A.6). Since dp LO =d < 0; the function 2 is increasing in : Suppose that < 1 ( ) : The utility V (W; d; p L ; LO ) decreases in and increases in because dp LO =d > 0; dp LO =d < 0 and Following the analysis in the previous section, the insurance coverage LO 1 + LO 2 of low-risk and overcon…dent agents decreases as the average price p LO increases.
Proof of Result 6.
In equilibrium, 
Solving out,
